Indonesia’s response has expanded from content removals to financial reviews and police investigations. This chronology follows those changes and keeps each figure in the unit used by the reporting agency.
Why Indonesia intensified the crackdown
Online gambling, commonly called judi online or judol, is prohibited in Indonesia. The government's response intensified as enforcement reports described activity spanning digital platforms, financial institutions and criminal investigations.
Timeline: from the 2024 task force to the 2026 financial push
2023–early 2024: broader digital enforcement
The Ministry of Communication and Informatics (Kominfo), predecessor of the Ministry of Communication and Digital Affairs (Komdigi), pursued takedowns and access restrictions against gambling-related websites and promotional material. A blocked domain could be replaced while the operator retained its payment accounts and social-media audience.
June 2024: a coordinated national response
Under President Joko Widodo, Presidential Decree No. 21 of 2024 established an Online Gambling Eradication Task Force. The effort brought together digital regulators, law enforcement and financial authorities rather than assigning the problem to website filtering alone. Hadi Tjahjanto was among the senior officials associated with this phase of coordination. Police action continued through the Indonesian National Police (Polri), including its Criminal Investigation Agency (Bareskrim) and cybercrime investigators.
October–November 2024: transition and intensified operations
After Prabowo Subianto became president in October 2024, enforcement remained a government priority. Kominfo's transition to Komdigi placed digital-platform oversight under the ministry led by Meutya Hafid. Authorities reported large numbers of gambling-related content actions and police investigations. A separate Online Gambling Eradication Desk was established in November under coordinating arrangements associated with Budi Gunawan, reinforcing cooperation across ministries and agencies.
The June task force and November desk were separate coordination arrangements. Police cases and Komdigi takedowns also count different things.
2025: following operators and transactions
Financial intelligence became a central measure of results. PPATK, headed during the period by Ivan Yustiavandana, analyzed gambling-related transactions and passed intelligence to investigators. OJK, the Financial Services Authority, directed banks to review suspicious relationships, strengthen customer checks and restrict accounts where warranted. Bank Indonesia's oversight of payment infrastructure formed part of the broader financial context, while banks and payment providers faced the operational challenge of distinguishing legitimate transactions from gambling flows.
Police investigations also examined payment facilitators and alleged money-laundering structures. In the H55 HIWIN investigation, PPATK described cooperation with Polri and the seizure of more than Rp14 billion. Names such as PT Digital Maju Jaya (SENCE) and PT Cahaya Lentera Harmoni appeared in reporting on related financial pathways. Mention in an investigation does not establish criminal liability without a relevant legal finding.
2026: bank-account disruption alongside site blocking
At an OJK banking forum on 14 July 2026, OJK, Komdigi and banking representatives emphasized a whole-of-ecosystem response. The account and content figures reported during this period are listed once in the table below; their dates and action definitions differ, so they should not be added together. Meutya Hafid argued that blocking access without disrupting accounts holding gambling funds would leave a critical part of the network intact.
Regulators also emphasized matching suspicious accounts against National Identity Numbers (Nomor Induk Kependudukan, NIK) when assessing related banking relationships.
Reported enforcement and financial measures
| Indicator | Reported figure | How to interpret it |
|---|---|---|
| Online-gambling turnover, 2024 | Rp359.81 trillion | PPATK's annual estimate of financial circulation, not government revenue or total gambler losses. |
| Online-gambling turnover, 2025 | Rp286.84 trillion | About 20% below 2024, according to PPATK. |
| Transactions in 2025 | 422.1 million | Transaction volume remains substantial even as monetary turnover falls. |
| Deposits in 2025 | Rp36.01 trillion | PPATK's January 2026 release compared this with Rp51.3 trillion in 2024. |
| People making deposits | 12.3 million | PPATK's reported count; not a measure of people convicted of an offence. |
| Content handled by July 2026 | More than 3.7 million items | Komdigi's cumulative content-enforcement measure; not 3.7 million unique operators. |
| Accounts blocked as of May 2026 | 32,454 | OJK's figure for accounts blocked following enhanced due diligence. |
| Accounts flagged for EDD and/or blocking by September 2026 | Approximately 38,796 | A later supervisory figure with a broader action definition. |
PPATK's January 2026 figures show a decline in both turnover and deposits, but the measures answer different questions. Turnover can include repeated circulation of funds; deposits describe money entering gambling channels. Neither is a direct estimate of net household losses. Higher detection rates, changes in reporting coverage or shifts to smaller payments can also change the observed transaction count.
How to read enforcement outcomes
Digital-content action is the ministry's response to reported material; it is not a count of operators or people reached. Financial-account restrictions measure another intervention, while investigations and court outcomes belong to later stages of the process. For the mechanics of domain blocking, see our guide to website restrictions; this timeline focuses on when enforcement priorities and reported outcomes changed.
What the crackdown means for people in Indonesia
Online gambling remains illegal; an offshore website, a social-media link or a familiar payment method does not make participation lawful. People should not allow others to use their bank accounts, NIK or e-wallet identities to receive unexplained payments. Such arrangements may expose the account holder to banking restrictions or investigation, even when the account holder claims not to operate a gambling website.
If a gambling promotion appears online, users can report it through the platform's reporting mechanism and relevant official government complaint channels. Suspicious bank transfers should be raised promptly with the bank or payment provider. People affected by gambling-related debt or compulsive play may also need financial and mental-health support; blocking a website does not resolve those harms by itself.
Anyone whose account is restricted can seek a review through the bank’s official complaint process and provide identification and transaction records.
Four measures to follow over time
Compare gambling deposits and turnover using stable definitions. Track whether restricted accounts reappear, whether cases reach court outcomes and whether users can still reach replacement sites. Publish the dates and counting rules for each series; split the trend when those rules change.